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Introduction: The Deadly Use of Culture
Culture is often cited by Japanese Ministers of Justice in support of capital pun-
ishment and in response to international pressure to end this policy.  In 2005, a for-
mer Minister of Justice, Hatoyama Kunio, maintained that capital punishment is an 
indigenous system deeply rooted in Japan’s own history and culture.1)  Earlier, at a 
seminar on “Judiciary and Human Rights in Countries that Hold Observer Status 
with the Council of Europe” held on May 28 and 29, 2002, the Minister of Justice at 
the time, Moriyama Mayumi, claimed that capital punishment is deeply embedded 
in the Japanese view on guilt.  According to her, it is represented by a concept, 
shinde wabiru, meaning atonement for one’s crime or shameful behavior by killing 
oneself.2)  Referring to this concept, the Japanese government has proclaimed that 
capital punishment functions as victim satisfaction.  Government ofﬁcials frequently 
use the phrase higaisha kanjo¯ wo ko¯ryo shite (respecting the feelings of the victims’ be-
reaved families) and cite a pro-death-penalty victim lobby’s claim that it is the “re-
sponsibility” of murderers to atone for their crimes through death.3)  Furthermore, 
Sakata Michita argues that the Japanese have nurtured this culture over the past 
2,000 years: abolishing capital punishment would amount to cultural denial.4)  This 
means that outside parties can have no say.
The main purpose of this paper is to critically examine the validity of the govern-
ment’s justiﬁcation for capital punishment on cultural grounds.  Through reconsider-
ing those cultural features claimed to be associated with capital punishment in Ja-
pan, it will explore whether or not the cultural narratives of the policy elite have 
inﬂuenced ordinary people and scholars alike to believe that Japan’s capital punish-
ment policy is domestically and culturally determined.  Firstly, it will investigate if 
the concept of shinde wabiru has been widely accepted as a social norm and supports 
the retention of capital punishment in Japan.  After recalling an occasion in which 
an act of shinde wabiru was committed, it will present conceptual and methodological 
problems regarding the application of this cultural value to the justiﬁcation of capi-
tal punishment.  It will also examine the divergence between pro- and anti-death-
penalty victim lobbies in their views of this concept.
Secondly, it will clarify the source of public resistance to the abolition norm.  It 
will investigate the degree to which Japanese consciousness on human rights and 
legal questions has contributed to public pro-death-penalty sentiment or resistance 
to the abolition of capital punishment.  Presenting the characteristics of the largest 
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anti-death-penalty NGO in Japan, Forum 90, it will then argue that public resistance 
does not appear to stem from cultural features but from a lack of sympathy towards 
the activities of domestic anti-death-penalty groups.  Finally, the conclusion will re-
examine the role of culture in Japan’s capital punishment policy.
2.  Capital Punishment as Social Justice and Victim Satisfaction Reconsidered
In order to investigate the government’s claim that capital punishment is deeply 
embedded in the Japanese view on guilt, represented by the concept of shinde wabi-
ru, this part will examine: (1) whether or not such a social norm exists in Japanese 
civil society with an overwhelming public consensus; and (2) whether the general 
public and the victim lobby believe that capital punishment functions as victim satis-
faction.
The Social Norm on Atonement through Death, “Shinde Wabiru”
General Nogi Maresuke and his wife committed seppuku following the state fu-
neral of Emperor Meiji in 1912.  His suicide note revealed that it was junshi–to 
commit seppuku upon the death of the lord–in order to expiate his disgrace in two 
main events: the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877 in which he lost the imperial banner to 
the enemy, and a battle in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–05 where 56,000 lives 
were lost, including his two sons.  In the siege of Port Arthur, although General Nogi 
commanded approximately 90,000 soldiers, the Commander in Chief, O¯yama Iwao, 
sensed that defeat was imminent under Nogi’s leadership.  Therefore, O¯yama ap-
pointed Kodama Gentaro¯ in his place as Chief of General Staff of the Manchuria 
Army at the end of November 1904.5)  Since this decision was not announced to the 
public, Nogi was celebrated as a national hero following Japan’s victory.6)  He took 
this as an undeserved honor, and a sense of shame made Nogi plead that he de-
served death on each occasion when he was granted an audience with the Emperor.7)
However, his death was not permitted since the Emperor knew that Nogi genu-
inely meant to atone for his disgrace.  Emperor Meiji told Nogi to live at least until 
his (the Emperor’s) death.8)  On the day of the state funeral of Emperor Meiji in 
1912, Nogi committed seppuku with his wife in order to atone for his disgrace.  No-
gi’s case drew worldwide popular and scholarly attention, centering on the the sep-
puku ritual and the cultural idea of shinde wabiru (to atone for one’s failings through 
death).  Some scholars argue that this cultural value is still accepted as a social norm 
in contemporary Japan and relate it to the Japanese view on criminals and death 
row inmates.  For example, Komiya Nobuo claims that “Japan is not a heaven for of-
fenders in terms of rehabilitation because the reintegrative function of Japanese soci-
ety is limited.”9)
According to Komiya, self-discipline is a virtue admired in Japan, and this has 
been a key factor not only in maintaining Japan’s exceptionally low crime rate but 
also in “expelling” criminals from society.10)  For example, arguments have been ad-
vanced that schools in Japan are inhospitable to original or critical thinkers since 
group harmony is held in high esteem, causing pupils to learn to “restrain selﬁsh be-
havior through various small group activities [… and to] continuously monitor […] 
one another’s behavior within the group.”11)  Fearing “deprivation of membership,” 
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pupils become submissive to authority, and this surveillance system also works in so-
ciety even after they grow up.  In the meantime, “one who neglects [… this repressive 
rule] is likely to be labeled as a social misﬁt and gradually excluded from one’s 
group.”12)  In other words, whilst self-control makes the group members’ bond stron-
ger and contributes to building of a crime-free society, once they become criminals 
it is difﬁcult for them and their families to return to society unblemished.
These “exclusive” attitudes of the public to offenders may imply that the Japanese 
public appreciates the norm of shinde wabiru to some extent.  However, three main 
concerns are aroused by Moriyama’s claim that the capital punishment system has 
been underpinned by such a concept in the modern period.  First, the seppuku ritual 
is a particular historical and political event linked with a particular set of sociological 
phenomena, and Nogi’s case was also a symbolic suicide, which aimed at appealing 
to the public with the “samurai spirit”13)–a sentiment not common in present-day 
Japan.  Secondly, a fact overlooked by the Ministry of Justice, the pro-death-penalty 
lobby and the general public is that spontaneity is required when an act of shinde 
wabiru is expected.  This action is considered meaningful only when it is committed 
by people on their own initiative after a feeling of remorse has been generated from 
the bottom of their hearts.14)  If it is conducted by the state’s authority on the date 
that the ministry bureaucrats choose at their convenience, it is a mere state killing.
Thirdly, one should note that the existence of another Japanese proverb, tsumi wo 
urande hito wo uramazu (condemn the crime rather than the criminal), has been ig-
nored in the government’s justiﬁcation for capital punishment.  If the government 
proclaims that capital punishment is deeply embedded in Japanese culture, it also 
needs to account for that proverb, which contrasts with shinde wabiru.  The following 
section will further investigate this issue and introduce arguments by both pro- and 
anti-death-penalty victim lobbies.  It will summarize the main claims from both lob-
bies about how criminals should atone for their crimes, and critically examine how 
frequently the concept of shinde wabiru can be found in death sentences or in the 
popular media as a widely accepted social norm.
The Pro-Death-Penalty Victim Lobby
In relation to this concept, it is also important to examine the pro-death-penalty 
lobby’s claim that only capital punishment can bring social justice to the bereaved 
families.  The Hikari case is a high-proﬁle murder incident where the victims’ be-
reaved family adopted such a position.  On April 14, 1999, an 18-year-old male 
broke into a house in Hikari city in Yamaguchi prefecture.  The offender, whose 
name was withheld until 201215) since he was a minor at the time of the crime, raped 
and strangled a 23-year-old woman, and strangled her baby daughter.  What made 
this case distinct from other juvenile crimes was that: (1) Motomura Hiroshi, hus-
band and father of the victims, called for the death sentence vocally; and (2) Yasuda 
Yoshihiro, an anti-death-penalty lobby activist and defense attorney for Asahara 
Sho¯ko¯–leader of the Aum Shinrikyo cult responsible for the Aum gas attack on the 
Tokyo underground railway in 199516)–joined the defense team in the Hikari case 
from March 2006.  The media coverage of these two helped create a simplistic pic-
ture of a “for or against” argument on capital punishment amongst the public.  As 
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Hamai Ko¯ichi and Thomas Ellis17) argue:
Motomura had a very charismatic persona as the grieving husband and father 
that was well attuned to TV chat shows and tabloid styles of approach.  In front 
of TV cameras and reporters, he has often produced emotional attacks on of-
fenders and argued that he would kill the murderer [… by himself], if he were 
released.
Whilst Motomura’s claim as a victim gained much sympathy from the public,18) the 
argument of the defense team, which comprised 20 veteran attorneys including Yasu-
da, sounded poor and did not garner support from the public towards the offender. 
The team argued that both victims died accidentally and that the offender even 
tried to revive both of them by raping the dead woman and leaving the dead baby in 
a cupboard so that Doraemon, a robotic cat manga character, could make any dream 
come true or would do something to help them.19)  The disclosure of the provocative 
letters that the offender wrote about the victims and Motomura also made the public 
doubt the credibility of the defense team’s claim, and this murder case left an ex-
tremely negative image of the anti-death-penalty movement in Japan.20)  It was only 
Ho¯so¯ Rinri Bangumi Ko¯jo¯ Kiko¯ (the Broadcasting Ethics and Program Improvement 
Organization) that vocally claimed that the excessive media coverage from the vic-
tims’ perspective had produced an unbalanced view of the case.21)
The defendent in the Hikari case was initially sentenced to life imprisonment 
considering his age and the possibility that he could be rehabilitated.  However, 
right before the ruling on April 22, 2008 when he was sentenced to capital punish-
ment at the age of 27, Motomura stated, “It’s his responsibility to let society know 
about the consequences of killing someone.”22)  He implied that capital punishment 
is necessary for social justice and to deter further serious crimes.  Motomura’s cam-
paigns were not strictly about stirring up pro-death-penalty sentiment.  His appear-
ance in the media appears to have contributed to making other victims’ bereaved 
families become publicly visible, and brought several changes to legal provisions.23)
Firstly, cooperating with Okamura Isao, an attorney whose wife was murdered on 
October 10, 1997, Motomura established an NGO, Zenkoku Higaisha no Kai (the Na-
tional Network for Victim Support), on January 23, 2000.  Motomura spoke on be-
half of victims’ bereaved families who could not express their feelings openly, and 
Hanzai Higaisha To¯ Kihon Ho¯ (the Basic Act on Crime Victims) was also enacted in 
order to protect their rights in November 2004.  In the meantime, it appears that 
such victim-driven activism was also strategically used by the Public Prosecutor’s 
Ofﬁce to amend the Juvenile Law in November 2000 and May 2007.  In particular, 
the amendment of the Juvenile Law in 2000 was the ﬁrst since World War II,24) and 
it lowered the minimum age for sending minors to reformatories from 16 to 14 in 
2000 and from “14 to around 12 (in 2007), stirring concerns among lawyers and le-
gal experts that tougher penalties might infringe on the rights of minors and might 
not lead to a reduction in juvenile delinquency.”25)  Harsher punishment of juvenile 
offenders was thus legalized as if the law was inﬂuenced by the growing power of the 
victim lobby.
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By contrast, when the Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the defendant and 
the death sentence was upheld on February 20, 2012, this appears to have put a 
brake on the pro-death-penalty mood in Japan.  The public had been highly sympa-
thetic to Motomura’s views at the time of the murder.  However, the realization that 
he was now rebuilding his own life (he had by this point remarried) while at the 
same time demanding that the offender be executed, removing any prospect of reha-
bilitation, was viewed as hypocritical and sympathy dissipated.  This did not alter 
the sentence as according to the judge, Kanetsuki Seiichi, “Despite a severe sense of 
victimization by the bereaved family, sincere remorse is not seen as the defendant 
made irrational pleas,” and the death sentence was inevitable.26)  Following this, an 
editorial in Asahi on February 21, 2012 posed an ethical question to the public, ask-
ing whether taking the life of one who had committed the crime as an 18-year-old 
boy was social justice and would bring happiness to Motomura:
The death sentence was ﬁnalized to the defendant.  However, if he had not 
reached the age 18 at the time of the crime, this court decision would not have 
been made.  The decision was that there is no other way than death for him to atone 
for the crime even considering his immaturity and possibility of correction and 
rehabilitation.  […] A death sentence is challenging for a judges to give.  A 
modern state, which aims to protect the individual life, deprives an individual 
of life under the name of law.  This is the contradiction that anti-death-penalty 
lobby claims.27)
Asahi thus alarmed the public about the legal legitimacy issue regarding state killing. 
In fact, in contrast to Motomura, another victim lobbyist in a capital punishment 
case had been lecturing across the country proclaiming the importance of rehabili-
tation of offenders: Harada Masaharu.  The following section will introduce an 
alternative voice to what the Japanese government cites as “the feelings of victims’ 
bereaved families.”
The Anti-Death-Penalty Victim Lobby
On January 24, 1983, Harada Akio, 30-year-old truck driver, was killed in an in-
cident that proved to be an insurance scam orchestrated by Hasegawa Toshihiko, 
the president of the company in which Harada was employed.28)  After Hasegawa 
was sentenced to death in two trials, he kept sending more than 100 letters to Hara-
da Masaharu, the victim’s brother, from death row; most of them were ﬁlled with 
words of apology and hope for the best for his family.  He also sent some drawings 
that were Hasegawa’s self-portraits.29)  It was not until 1986 that Harada ﬁnally be-
gan to read Hasegawa’s letters, and he visited Hasegawa in the detention center in 
1993.  Facing Hasegawa who had apologized sincerely, Harada felt a sense of com-
fort and healing for the ﬁrst time, if not forgiveness towards Hasegawa.30)  Harada 
also got to know that Hasegawa’s sister and son committed suicide as they were 
ashamed that Hasegawa had been arrested.  Harada then started to believe that an-
other unnatural death such as suicide should be avoided, and that Hasegawa should 
compensate for his wrongdoing by living and expressing remorse to Harada for the 
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rest of his life.31)
Since Hasegawa had already exhausted the appeals process and the death sen-
tence had been ﬁnalized, Harada handed in a petition on April 18, 2001 to the then 
Minister of Justice, Ko¯mura Masahiko, calling on him to halt Hasegawa’s execution. 
Ko¯mura declared in front of a TV crew that Hasegawa’s execution would not be au-
thorized immediately.32)  However, despite Harada’s pleas, Hasegawa was executed 
on December 27, 2001 under the authorization of the following Minister of Justice, 
Moriyama Mayumi.  Although the Japanese government often claims that capital 
punishment is carried out considering the feelings of the victims in Japan, Hasegawa 
was executed in contradiction to Harada’s wishes.
Through this experience, Harada claimed that capital punishment does not nec-
essarily bring closure or satisfaction to the bereaved families.33)  Similarly, Katayama 
Tadaari, who lost his eight-year-old son in a trafﬁc accident on November 28, 1997, 
declared:
It should be realized that each bereaved family has different views […,] and 
within a family the father, mother, or the victim’s brothers and sisters have 
their own opinions.  We cannot refer to ‘victims’ or ‘bereaved families’ in a 
lump.  […] I want to see a system where victims are fully supported ﬁnancially 
and psychologically and they could have a venue for dialogue with offenders, 
who will return to society in the future, rather than feuding with each other.34)
Harada describes crime victims as those who have been pushed off a cliff by crimi-
nals, and the rest of the Japanese citizens as those who live peacefully on the cliff 35): 
the latter never say, “Hang in there!  We will lift you up!” but only shout from above, 
“You must be hurt.  We will also push the criminal off the cliff so you would feel bet-
ter.”36)  Harada claims that the public as the third party usually seeks to promote 
more severe punishment for the criminals without being aware of what they can re-
ally do to heal the bereaved families’ mental wounds.  Thus, there exists a dichotomy 
within the victim lobby on the ways criminals should atone for crimes.  Whilst the 
government proclaims that capital punishment is deeply embedded in cultural val-
ues concerning life and death, and provides some satisfaction for the victim, some 
victim lobby campaigners not only do not share this view, but actively challenge it. 
It is only the voice of the pro-death-penalty victim lobby that is used for the govern-
ment’s justiﬁcation of capital punishment.  The following section will explore how 
the media has contributed to creation of “public opinion on capital punishment.”
The Inﬂuence of the Media in Shaping Pro-Death-Penalty Sentiment amongst the Public
On ﬁrst examination, it appears that the media tend to let the public make up 
their minds whether to support Motomura’s vocal pro-death-penalty campaigns or 
Yasuda’s anti-death-penalty campaigns.  However, the media usually only reports af-
ter an incident occurs, the offender is arrested and capital punishment is imposed. 
These reports provide basic information, yet are sufﬁcient to perpetuate the public 
myth of capital punishment as social justice and to exacerbate public fear about abo-
lition of the system.  The media rarely feature detention conditions or the exact 
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method of execution in any detail.  Nor do they highlight any remorse expressed by 
offenders.  Consequently, it is difﬁcult for the public to be aware of psychological 
changes in offenders’ feelings towards the bereaved families or remorse about the 
crimes committed, as the Harada case shows.  In other words, the public has sup-
ported capital punishment over the years without being given sufﬁcient information 
about the physical experiences of being a death row inmate, nor with a sense of 
them as individuals with emotional and psychological responses to their own ac-
tions.
It is not necessarily the media’s fault that the public are not fully informed about 
the capital punishment system.  Rather, it is closely related to the secretive policy of 
the Ministry of Justice that has hindered the media’s ability to gain access to Minis-
try ofﬁcials to discuss these issues.  However, in the interviews I conducted with 
journalists from the two main newspaper agencies, both stated that having been able 
to know the victims through interviews, they tended to become sympathetic towards 
the bereaved families and as a result articles tend to be written from the victims’ 
perspective.37)  Although it is not impossible for journalists to interview offenders, 
they cannot spend a comparative amount of time to that spent interviewing be-
reaved families, especially after the offender is detained.  It is crucial that the media 
enable the alternative victim lobby voices to be heard by the public in order to dem-
onstrate the diversity in opinion amongst victims’ families and to reﬂect that capital 
punishment does not necessarily bring a sense of justice to all bereaved families.
Both Motomura’s and the general public’s support for capital punishment appears 
to be partially founded upon a simple misunderstanding about the severity of the 
main alternative, life imprisonment with parole, rather than based upon complex 
factors.  According to Article 28 of the Penal Code:
When a person sentenced to imprisonment with or without work evinces signs 
of substantial reformation, the person may be paroled by a disposition of a gov-
ernment agency after that person has served one-third of the deﬁnite term sen-
tenced or 10 years in the case of a life imprisonment.
Therefore, there is a tendency for the public to perceive life imprisonment with pa-
role as a fairly mild penalty, and a widespread belief that those convicted of serious 
crimes will be released within ten to 15 years.  However, statistics from 2007 show 
that on average offenders are released after 31 years and ten months; and “the 
chances of release on parole among lifers have almost disappeared and a life sentence 
really does mean ‘until death’ in Japan.”38)  In an attempt to narrow this perceived 
“gap” between capital punishment and life imprisonment, there has emerged a 
movement promoting the introduction of life imprisonment without parole.39) 
However, domestic discussion has barely commenced.  The governmental opinion 
polls do not pose such questions, and the ethical debate on whether life imprisonment 
without parole would be as cruel as capital punishment, or more so, has yet to be re-
solved amongst legal experts or within the anti-death-penalty lobby.  Therefore, 
public support for capital punishment does not appear to stem from either a deﬁnite 
reliance upon or coherent understanding of the capital punishment system itself. 
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Rather, it is heavily inﬂuenced by the weighted media coverage of serious crimes 
and misunderstanding of the only current alternative, life sentence with parole.  The 
potential to explore the debate around life sentences with or without parole has been 
signiﬁcantly hampered by a lack of governmental effort to discuss the issues.
To sum up, what makes the retributive sentiment look “Japanese” appears to be 
strategic narratives constructed by policy elites.  Whilst social norms on atonement 
through death may exist in civil society, inﬂuenced by the Japanese public’s posses-
sion of self-discipline and their views on criminals and death row inmates, the exis-
tence of such a norm does not lead inexorably to the state retaining capital punish-
ment.  Given that the issue of maintaining capital punishment is elite-driven, it is the 
governmental discourse, which refers to the historical and cultural practice, that has 
been making Japanese culture look like a determining factor for justiﬁcation of the 
system.  Having examined what cultural features have been proclaimed by the Japa-
nese government to be supporting capital punishment, the following section will in-
vestigate what other cultural factors appear to be hindering the Japanese public 
from considering the anti-death-penalty norm.
3.  Public Resistance to the Anti-Death-Penalty Norm Reconsidered
While the cultural value of shinde wabiru may not be appreciated by the contem-
porary Japanese public, other cultural features may appear to be associated with 
public support for capital punishment.  This section will critically examine the ex-
tent to which Japanese legal and human rights consciousness has contributed to pub-
lic resistance to abolishing the death penalty.  It will contend that it is not necessari-
ly Japanese cultural values that have been hindering the abolitionist movement, but 
rather the principles and characteristics of domestic anti-death-penalty NGOs that 
have failed to garner wide public support for abolition.
Japanese Human Rights and Legal Consciousness
First of all, retention of capital punishment in Japan might on ﬁrst reﬂection imply 
that the Japanese public has lower human rights consciousness than the public in 
Western countries.  However, as the Japanese government has treated the issue of 
capital punishment from the perspective of criminal justice, the Japanese public has 
not been given opportunities to discuss the human rights perspective in any depth 
or with access to the relevant information.
A Public Survey on the Defense of Human Rights ( Jinken yo¯go ni kansuru yoron 
cho¯sa) is conducted by the Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce every ﬁve years; in 2007, some 
1,776 out of 3,000 people aged 20 or older responded.  With regard to the question: 
“Which of the following human rights issues are you concerned with?,” 19 issues are 
listed as possible choices (see Table 1).  What is noteworthy is that most domestic hu-
man rights issues raised by the Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce are signiﬁcantly different 
from the issues that concern the international society in relation to Japan, for exam-
ple: (1) treatment of prisoners; (2) lack of an independent national human rights insti-
tution; (3) historical responsibility for the ianfu (comfort women) system during the 
war; and (4) the rights of minorities and foreigners.40)
It is understandable that domestic concerns raised by the national government 
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are more likely to focus upon daily or local issues whilst those raised by international 
society tend to be more internationally critical issues from a global comparison. 
However, since there is no question in the survey relating to the treatment of prison-
ers, there is little chance that the public would treat related issues such as detention 
conditions and execution methods for death row inmates as human rights issues in 
Japan.  Excluding these issues from the opinion polls appears to act as an inhibitor 
contributing to a stiﬂing of public engagement in a domestic debate on capital pun-
ishment.  Therefore, it is a difﬁcult task to statistically observe the Japanese public’s 
attitude towards human rights of prisoners or death row inmates in particular, or to 
claim that retention of capital punishment stems from the low human rights con-
sciousness of the Japanese public.  
Table 1: Opinion Poll on Defense of Human Rights
by the Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce “Which of the Following Human 
Rights Issues are you Concerned with?”
Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce, “Jinken Yogo ni Kansuru Yoron Chosa” 2007, 
available at http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h19/h19-jinken/index.html 
[last accessed on March 20, 2013].
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Similarly, the state of Japanese legal consciousness may contribute to an explana-
tion of why the general public does not demonstrate much sympathy towards do-
mestic anti-death-penalty activities.  In other words, if the Japanese public has “low” 
legal consciousness overall, they may not necessarily show particular interest in the 
activists’ campaigns which seek to challenge the existing legal system.  For example, 
a low litigation rate in Japan by comparison with other industrialized countries41) 
may make it appear that the Japanese public has “low” legal consciousness and do 
not support the anti-death-penalty lobby which seeks to challenge the existing legal 
provisions.  According to Meryll Dean,42) the Japanese public tends to “regard law 
like an heirloom samurai sword, something to be treasured but not used,” and prefer 
to settle disputes informally through mediation.
A legal sociologist, Kawashima Takeyoshi, agrees and also claims that individual 
members of the Japanese public do not appear to assert their legal rights.  According 
to Kawashima, whilst duty or norms are emphasized in Japanese society, terms such 
as kenri (rights) did not exist when Japan imported a Western legal system, which 
has made translation work challenging.43)  His preposition is that once a contract is 
made in any profession, a master-servant relationship arises: when troubles occur in 
this power dynamic, mediation is preferred and any sense of injustice is expected to 
be mizu ni nagasu (washed away) through apology or small compensation.  If some-
one seeks to bring a lawsuit, this behavior is seen as morally wrong, subversive, and 
rebellious and it is these cultural expectations that appear to have been contributing 
to the low litigation rates in Japan.44)  Wagatsuma Hiroshi and Arthur Rosett have 
also explained the nature and impact of the apology culture in Japan.  Both high-
light that the Japanese tend to apologize even for something that is not entirely their 
fault, and this derives from their wish to maintain community harmony and stabili-
ty.45)  Such a cultural preference might not appear likely to motivate the Japanese 
public to support the anti-death-penalty lobby’s vocal campaigns, which focus upon 
lobbying the government to repeal or amend legal provisions.
However, as with the complications in establishing an understanding of human 
rights consciousness, it is difﬁcult to accurately evaluate Japanese legal conscious-
ness.  When explaining why the informal way is preferred for solving problems, it is 
worth noting the conciliation methods employed in Japan.  For example, companies 
usually provide employees with insurance to cover a mediating service in case of 
trafﬁc accidents, and this reduces the need for the individual to bring a lawsuit.  Le-
gal procedures are implemented only after all the available conciliation methods 
have been exhausted, and by that point, the problem is normally solved peacefully 
through the efforts of mediators.  Therefore, the low litigation rate in Japan does not 
necessarily stem from a “low” level of legal consciousness among the Japanese pub-
lic, but from widespread preference that values conciliation above the potentially 
more combative litigation.  More precisely, the legal consciousness of the Japanese 
public cannot be examined solely through the lens of culture or institutions, but 
should rather encompass both study areas.46)
Finally, the next section will examine the speciﬁc characteristics of one of the 
largest anti-death-penalty NGOs, which appear to be having a greater impact than 
any cultural factors and are directly contributing to the failure to gain sympathy 
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from the majority of public for the cause of abolition.
Characteristics of Anti-Death-Penalty NGOs in Japan
Currently, Forum 90, founded in 1990, is the largest anti-death-penalty NGO in 
Japan.  Yasuda Yoshihiro is one of the key founders of Forum 90, and as already dis-
cussed, he is a criminal lawyer widely known for his activities in high-proﬁle murder 
cases.  He was one of the defense counsel for Asahara Sho¯ko¯, who was responsible 
for the Aum Shinrikyo¯ gas attack on the Tokyo underground railway in 1995, and 
also as defense counsel for the offender, then a minor, in the Hikari case in 1999.  
The Asahara Sho¯ko¯ case involved the most serious security threat in Japan in de-
cades requiring the deployment of 60,000 police along with massive numbers of the 
Self-Defense Forces (SDF).  Asahara Sho¯ko¯ was leader of the Aum Shinrikyo¯, a reli-
gious sect with 10,000 members that sought to maximize the impact of its protest 
against government through organized crimes.  Fifty-eight SDF members had been 
identiﬁed as Aum members by the autumn of 1995.  The sect’s commitment to crime 
from the late 1980s to the early 90s is abundantly clear.47)  Some core members were 
among the brightest scientists in Japan, and the gas attack was planned using their 
skills with devastating effect.48)  The media portrayed the organization as an ‘atro-
cious murder group’ or a ‘brainwashed spooky cult group’ and its removal from soci-
ety became a high priority for restoring public safety in Japan.49)  The public mood 
was that Asahara should be sentenced to death and executed as soon as possible, 
and the trial for the Aum gas attack commenced despite the prevailing assessment 
amongst psychiatrists being that Asahara lacked the mental capacity to stand trial.50)
Whilst the Aum gas attack created an extremely negative image of the anti-death-
penalty movement,51) public resistance to abolishing the death penalty became more 
evident after Yasuda joined the defense team in the Hikari case.  In defense of a mi-
nor offender, the team claimed that the defendant had tried to revive both victims 
using the power of the Doraemon, a robotic cat manga character, which could make 
any dreams come true and use supernatural powers.52)  However, as soon as the me-
dia featured the defense team’s claim, Yasuda was severely criticized.  For example, 
the Japan Federation of Bar Associations received more than 8,000 calls from the 
public demanding the disbarment of Yasuda,53) and Forum 90 received abusive calls 
on a daily basis.54)
In my interview, an anonymous NGO member stated that Yasuda’s activities as a 
defense attorney deﬁnitely became a setback to the anti-death-penalty campaign.55) 
The combination of Yasuda’s professional responsibility as a defense counsel with 
his passion to achieve abolitionism in Japan meant that his arguments were often 
presented from the perspective of suspected criminals, a stark contrast with the ma-
jority view of the victim lobby or the general public.56)  Since Yasuda is a high 
proﬁle ﬁgure associated with a well-known anti-death-penalty NGO, the abolitionist 
lobby is viewed as homogeneous and labeled collectively as placing emphasis on the 
human rights of criminals while giving too little consideration to the feelings of be-
reaved families.57)  Consequently, the public tends to show resistance to abolitionist 
activities, which in this context are viewed as going against the wider public good.
Cultural explanations for the Japanese public’s failure to show sympathy towards 
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anti-death-penalty NGO activities–for example, that the Japanese public has a dis-
tinctive view of death and life or possess “low” human rights or legal consciousness 
–do not reﬂect the full story.  Rather, it is the role and distinctive characteristics of 
key anti-death-penalty NGOs that appear to have contributed to their failure to win 
broad support amongst the public.  In particular, the different ideas of social justice 
expressed by high proﬁle members of the NGO–views that reﬂect their professional 
role and passion to bring abolitionism to Japan–have polarized rather than trans-
formed public opinion.58)
4.  Conclusion
This paper critically examined the governmental justiﬁcation of capital punish-
ment on cultural grounds.  Pro-death-penalty Ministers of Justice claim that capital 
punishment is deeply embedded in the Japanese view of guilt, and some invoke the 
example of the concept of shinde wabiru.59)  However, this paper discussed the con-
ceptual and methodological problem in application of this concept to capital punish-
ment policy, highlighting the divergence between pro- and anti-death-penalty victim 
lobbies in their views on social justice.
Whilst the Japanese view on criminals or death row inmates appears to relate to 
this social norm, there are several problems with the application of this concept to 
support the death penalty.  The ritual of shinde wabiru is a particular sociological 
phenomenon conducted by samurai warriors, and not a common practice in con-
temporary Japan.  A fact overlooked by pro-death-penalty Ministers of Justice is that 
spontaneity is a key component for this act and the action is voluntary rather than 
state enforced.  Also, a contrasting proverb has been ignored in their claims.  Al-
though the Japanese public’s human rights and legal consciousness may initially ap-
pear to support the death penalty to some extent, it should be noted that method-
ological problems in measuring this have been overlooked.  The government 
justiﬁes capital punishment as victim satisfaction as do the media, but nonetheless, 
there exists an anti-death-penalty victim lobby, which poses an ethical question 
about whether state killing can bring closure to a crime.  “Public opinion on the 
death penalty” appears to be shaped by the governmental claims; the media, which 
feature a sensationalist pro-death-penalty victim lobby; and a public image of a par-
ticular anti-death-penalty activist group.  Consequently, there is a need for careful 
attention to the government’s strategic use of culture in its defense of capital punish-
ment.  It appears that it is the governmental narratives, which refer to historical and 
cultural practice, that have been shaping the view that Japanese culture is a deter-
mining factor for justiﬁcation of the system.
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